Aker v Trump davasının ortaklarından Avukat Greg Siskind 85 sayfalık dava karar metni için özet bir çalışma yapmış,hem linki hemde translate çevirisi ile okumak isteyenler için İngilizce metnini buraya bırakıyorum
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Siskind Summary: Gomez v. Trump – The Preliminary Injunction Order By Greg Siskind ([email protected]) 1. Background This is a summary of the Memorandum and Order of Judge Amit Mehta in the above-listed case as well as four other cases consolidated with it. One of those cases is Akerv. Trump, acase that Siskind Susser is co-counsel on sought relief for Divers ity Visa ("DV") applicants. The beginning of the memorandum discusses the circumstances that led to the case- the issuance of the two proclamations in April and June by President Trump. The judge first summarizes the cl aims of the 1,076 plaintiffs in the five cases. The claims all challenge the validity of the Proclamations on various statutory and constitutional grounds and they all assert the sus pension of visas violates the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA") Also, the DV-2020 plaintiffs separately raisethe harm of losing out on their opportunity for a green card if their visas are not issued by September 30, 2020 and claim the State Department fail ing to issue the visas is arbitrary. The court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court rejected the statutory and constitutional challenges to the Proclamations but held the failure to review and adjudicate the DV claims exceeds statutory a uthority and is arbitrary and capricious. The DV plaintiffs have been held to meet the requirements for injuncti on relief while the non-DV plaintiffs have not. The plaintiffs have also sought class certification in various subclasses. The court denied without prejudice the DV class certification and deferred the class certification with respect to the other four putative subclasses. Thejudge then goes on to review the visasystem and the various visa categories covered in the two bans. Healso notes that that the State Department has interpreted the Proclamations to sus pend not only entry but al so the issuance of visas in categories covered under the Proclamations and visas are only to be issued to those the post believes meet an exception to the Proclamations, "including the national interest exception (NIE), and that constitute a mission-critical category." While all posts were barred from issuing visas to non-critical people, beginning in July vis a processing resumed. Still, those subject to the 4/22 and 6/22 were not permitted to receive visas without an NIE. DV applicants are "double doomed" because the y are not being treated as mission critical and are also barred under the "no-visa policy." The judge next goes on to summarize the five underlying cases. Three of the cases - Mohammed, Fonjong and Aker – cover DV plaintiffs exclusively. Panda v. Pompeo covers H-1B applicants and Gomez covers all affectedcategories, including DV applicants. I. Legal Standa rd The court begins by reciting the four requirements for injunctive relief:
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- The plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; 2. The plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; 3. The balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor, and 4. An injunction is in the public interest. Where there is a government defendant, the last two factors merge. II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits The government argued three impediments to the plaintiffs' claims: lack of standing, consular non-reviewa bility bars review of their claims, and they lack a causeof action. A. Threshold Justiciability Questions 1. Standing To establishstanding, the plaintiff must show 1) she has suffered a concrete and particularized injury 2) that is fairly traceable to the challengedaction of the defendant and 3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. The govemment claims plaintiffs refer to emails in their declarations but didn't include the emails in their filings. Thecourt thoug ht otherwise and found the plaintiffs have supplied "specificfacts" to establish a likelihood of standing. The judge specificallydiscusses one plaintiff in the Gomez case- Aya Nakamura, a Japanesenational – to illustrate. Regarding causation, the judge againuses Nakamura to illustrate and finds that the Proclamation is the primary cause of not getting the visa (alsonoting that the government did not dispute that ground). Regarding redressability, the plainti ffs don't need to show that they would get their visas, but insteadjust need to show that their interest could be better protected. The court used Nakamura againto a ddress the government's argument that consulate closures would mean a DV visa would be unlikel y to get issued. Tokyo, however, is open and now proces sing immigrant visas. And the government's argument that Nakamura hasn't proven she will geta visas. But there are no reasons asserted why a consular officer might deny a visa. Therefore, the Gomez plaintiffs have met their burden. The court found that the Mohammed, Fonj ong and Aker cases all met their burdens as well. 2. Consular Non-Reviewability This is a doctrine basedon the principle of international lawthat nation states have the inherent right to exclude or admit aliens and this is entrusted to the political branches of government so as to be largelyimmune from judicial interference. The court notes that not every legal challenge touching on admission of foreign national is foreclosed by consular nonreviewability. Challenging inaction as opposed to a negative decision, for example, is acceptable. And that's what's being challenged here.
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- Cause of Action The government says these cases all rest on the APA and the President is not subject to the APA. The judge responded by noting that all of the plaintiffs' claims do not arise under the APA. The Gomez, Aker, and Panda plaintiffs all advance causes of action that assert the Proclamations exceedthe scope of the President's congressionally granted authority which can either be construed as ultra vires (outside the scope of a statute) claims or a cause of action under the Immigration and Nationality Act. And it is not true that the President can't be challenged under the APA. B. Challenges to Proclamations 10014 and 10052 The court first looks at the Gomez and Aker claims that 1) the Proclamations are ultra vires because they do not satisfy the statutory prerequisites for sus pension of entry under INA 212(f) and 2) the President's issuance of the Proclamations violate the Take Care Clause the the Due Process Clause and deny equal protection under the law. 1. Ultra Vires Presidential Action The judge recites 212(f) and notes that the casemust be analyzed first under the 2018 Supreme Court decision of Trump v Hawa ii which upheld the "Muslim Ban". The Supreme Court held in that casethat the President had broad discretion to sus pend the entry of aliens to the US and the statute "exudes deference" to the President in every clause. The President only needs to find that the entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The plaintiffs in Hawaii argued that the President's "finding" was not sufficiently detailed to enable judicial review, but the Supreme Court held that it was detailed enough. The plaintiffs in this case argued that the President must supply a rational justificationand conduct some rational investigation and that the facts simply show the oppos ite regarding the impact of immigrants on the US jobs market. However, the judge found that the demand for a "rational jus tification" and a "rational investigation" far exceeds what the court required. The court alsorejected the claim that the standard is not the same when adomestic policy is the justificationfor the use of 212(f). The statute does n't make that distinction and excluding aliens is inherent in the executive power to control foreign affairs. And the court is not in a position to judge the wisdom of the President's decisionto address changed economic circumstances. The court addressed the 9th Circuit case Doe #1 v. Trump which holds that economic reasons don't get the same level of deference and simply says it di sag rees with that court's analysis. The court alsofound that the President's recitation of unemployment statistics was sufficient. The President doesn't need to be right or wise in drawing his concl usions. And while limiting
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review by acourt of this may not be smart, Congress needs has written the law broadly (and canpresumably change it). 2. Separation of Powers The plaintiffs argued that the Proclamations are invalid because they violate foundational separation-of-powers principles and Congress has alreadycarefully prescri bed the requirements for foreign nationals who seek to enter the US. The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii stated that 212(f) does not allow the President to expressly overide particular provisions of the INA. The court held that while the Proclamations restrict the entry of various immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classification, they do not expressly overide any of them. Those categories are not abolished, and full admission will presumably resume when the labor market recovers. Plus, there are now a variety of exceptions. 3. Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Authority The plaintiffs made a constitutional challenged to INA Section 212(f) by arguing that Congress doesn't have the authority to delegate authority so broadly to the President. The Hawaii case is disting uishable because Congress can delegate more broadly in the sphere of internati onal affairs andnational security. The court disagreed finding that the text of 212(f) is clear and that there have only been two cases in history where a del egation was invalidated. The court found the plaintiffs failed because it hasn't shown that Congress failed to supply an intelligible principle to guide the President's use of discretion. 4. Remaining Constitutional Claims Regarding the Take Care Claus e, the court is not considering it becauseit's duplicative of the ABA arbitrary-and-capricious claim which the plaintiffs have won on. Regarding the Due Process Clause, the plaintiffs have not invoked a constitutional framework to support the claimand instead argue that failing to comply with the APA violates the due process rights of the plaintiffs. The lackof an ability to comment is a key part of this argument. The court found no case tosupport this notion of Due Process and the Aker lawyers' later arguments in the reply brief about due process protections for lawful permanent resident spous es comes too late. Regarding the equal protection arguments, the court found that the 5th Amendment protections don't apply to people outs ide the US and with regard to the three plaintiffs in the Aker casewho are in the US, there is a "plausible reas on" to differentiate because the entry of people to the US to enter the labor market is the basis of the Proclamation and those in the US are logically excluded.
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Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs animus argument – that Trump's preexisting animus toward the DV program makes the Proclamation unconstitutional. The judge agreed that Trump is indeed hostile, but the Hawaii case's rejection of a similarchallenge based on purpos ed religious animus failed, sothis should as well. C. Challenges to the Implementation of Proclamations 10014 and 10052 This section addresses the various APA and Mandamus Act challenges. The first challenge is to the "No-Visa Policy" as being in excess of the government's statutory authority and it us urps the role of cons ular officers. Second, the policy is arbitrary and capricious beca use it lacks any reasoned explanation, fails toconsider reliance interests and fails toconsider important aspects of the problem. Third, the government failed to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaki ng. Fourth, the government has unreas ona bly delayed adjudicating DV-2020 vis a a pplications. And fifth, the decision not to treat DV applicants as "mission critical" or "emergency" cases violates the APA. 1. No-Visa Policy - Not in Accordance with Law The argument boils down to the Proclamations not speaking to visa issuance a nd 212(f) also not speaking to visa issuance. The government responded by saying there is no final agency action and DOS' refusal to process non-exempt covered visas is lawful because INA 221(g) prohibits consular officers from issui ng visas to pers ons declared ineligiblefor visas under 212(f). The court noted that 212(f) only speaks to entries. And 221(g) only says a consular officer should deny a visa if a person appears i neligible for a visa. It does not speak to people ineligible to enter. And those people deemed ineligible to receive a visa under 221(g) refer to 212(a) and not 212(f). The court alsosaid the Supreme Court in the Hawaii case didn't rule on the issue of visas - just on entry. The court alsosaid it was unpersuaded by the Defenda nts' argument that interpreting the INA to allow the issuance of visas to person who might be ineligible to enter the country under a 212(f) proclamation would result in "administrative confusion." Congress may have intended this since anentry ban may only be for a few weeks or months and a visa can be valid for years. There is no final agency action issue once it's clearthat there is no bar on issuing visas. The order to stop issuing visas is a final action. The government's argument that this is consistent with 221(g) fails. "Because Defendants have not identified any statutory authority that would permit the suspension of this ordinary process, the court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Defendants' No-Visa Policy is "not in accordance with law" and "in excess of statutory... authority.""
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- No-Visa Policy -Arbitrary and Capricious The court agreed that the government offered no rational explanation for the No-Visa policy except its incorrect assumption that this was requi red by law. Agency a ction that stands on a faulty legal premiseisarbitrary and capricious. 3. No-Visa Policy - Notice and Comment Rulemaking The Aker plaintiffs argue that the policy violates the APA because it didn't have a notice and comment process. The government saidit was at most an interpretive rule and not subject to the same requirements. Given this is not an automatic consequence of the Proclamations and it's changing the law by suspending visa processing, it's alegislative rule. The court skips this, however, because it's unnecessary and beca use the court would need additional information from the government. 4. Unreas onable Delayof Processing DV-2020 Visa Applica tions The court agrees that the govemment has unreasonably delated processing of DV-2020 visas. The court looked at six factors cited in the TRAC case: (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) de lays thot might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulati on are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassi tude in order to hold that agency action is 'unreasonably delayed." Regarding the first two factors, the INA provides a clearindication of speed with res pect to DV selectees – the unyiel ding deadline of September 30th, And a reas onable deadline is counted in weeks or months, not years. "Surely a delay that results in the permanent loss of a statutory benefit is not reasonable." The government didn't dispute that the third and fifth factors favor a finding of unreas onable delay. The fourth factor is a closer call but ultimately doesn't militate againsta finding of unreas onable delay especially since the government's claimthat it's a waste and they are ineligi ble for visas has been contra dicted. The judge noted he was sensitive to the difficulties presented to consulates by the pandemic, but indicated that there was no reasonto support not making these cases "mission critical." And consulates have been reopening for two months, but DV cases are still considered low priority. There may be some cons ulates inca pable of operating, but that does n't justify a
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worldwide ban. Finally, while the government cites the INA's policy of a 30-day timeframe for K- 1s and a 60-day timeframe for all other family-preference cases and the plai ntiffs shouldn't jump the line, no evidence is provided suggesting the government is inca pable of adjudi cating in the required time period. The court simply notes it has enough reasons and skips factor six. 5. Exclusion of DV-2020 Visa Applications from Mission Critical Processing The 4/22 and 6/22 aren't the only obstacle for DV plaintiffs. The COVID shutdowns are as well and the DV cases have been giventhe lowest priority. The court agrees that excluding DV cases from the "mission critical" list was a rbitrary and capricious" because no explanation has been offered. The fact that this policy was only revealed in discovery after the 8/7 conference also weighed on the judge and plaintiffs acted promptly basedon the information. IV. Remaining Factors Governing Preliminary Relief A. DV-2020 Plaintiffs 1. Irreparable Harm The DV Plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. The government does n't contest this. "That was asmart choice." 2. Balance of Equities and Public Interest The plaintiffs meet the final two factors of the requirements for injunctive relief. "There is generallyno public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action." The public interest is served by compliance with the APA." The govemment argued that it would threaten the health of cons ular officers. But plaintiffs are not asking the government to abandon its "Diplomacy Strong" operating procedures. B. Gomez Non-DV Plaintiffs The court rules the other way for the non-DV plaintiffs because there is no established ca usal link between the injunction sought and the alleged injury. Because of the ban on entry, granting relief won't put them in a better position since they remain eligible after the proclamation is lifted. "The public interest factor alsodoes not support these Plaintiffs. Issuing injunctive relief that could be construed to mean that the State Department must issue visas to people who have no immediate pros pect for entering the country could create substantial havoc and confusion."
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V. Remedy and Class Certification for the Dv-2020 Plaintiffs A. Scope of Relief The government asserts that injunctive relief must be "sharply limited" and tailored to the injury asserted by the plainti ffs." The DCc Circuit precedent is that when a court decides agency rules are unlawful, the ordinary resultis that the rules are vacated. The court has the power to issue all necessary and appropriate process to compel agency acti on when needed to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the action. An important equity here is the country's strong interest in the uniform application of immigration law and policy. Were the court to limit relief to the DV-2020 plaintiffs only and not the 1000s of other DV-2020 applicants whose applications were also suspended, 1000s of individual laws uits would likelyfollow and potentially dis parate outcomes of thos e cases would result in widespread confusion. B. Class Certification The court finds it need not rule on the motions for class certification because all DV-2020 applicants will benefit from the relief of the court. Vi. Conclusion a nd Order Reciting that the challenge to the proclamations fails, but the challenge to the no-visa policy wins. The court orders 1. The no-visa policy isstayedas itapplies to DV-2020 selectees and derivati ves. 2. The government shall undertake good-faith efforts to process by 9/30 3. The government may not use the COVID guidance to slow cases down beca use they're not missioncritical or emergency 4. The court won't give an extension of the deadline as the plaintiffs have requested but will have a hearing not later than 9/25 and will assess atthat point. 5. The class motion for DV-2020 selectees is denied. 6. The class motion for the other classes is deferred 7. The motion to enjoin the two proclamations is denied.
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